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ff1 HE relations between the European Com-
I munity and Japan, and the triangular rela-I tionship of both of them with the U.S., are
highly complex. In the economic sphere alone, they
embrace not only visible trade. but also financial
services and capital movements, cross-investment,
industrial and technological tie-ups, a mutual interest
in commercially related research and development,
and so forth. In addition, there are the political and
strategic interests shared in varying degree between
the three partners in a shifting and unstable inter-
national environment.
Today I want to concentrate on visible trade
because this is an aspectof EC-Japan relations which
hits the headlines, and which ties in quite closely
with your own preoccupations in Japan. Unhappily,
it also carries the risk, if it is mishandled, of causing
a major international upset. I do not intend to discuss
trade in its sectoral, micro-economic details-you
know them better than I do; they are your daily bread
and butter.Instead, I shall go for the overall picture,
by following a more macrG'economic approach.
Let me quote at the outset the words of a l7th
century English metaphysical poet. His name was
John Donne. He wrote: "No man is an Island, entire
of itself; everyman is a piece of the Continent, a part
of the Main. Any man's death diminishes me, because
I am involved in Mankind; and therefore never send
to know for whom the bell tolls: it tolls for thee."
These words are curiously apt to the U.S./EC/
Japan interrelationship today. The three of us
together account for over half the annual gross
product of the free world. We conduct 56 percent
of free-world trade. Bilateral trade between the three
of us is substantial: last year US$27 billion worth
of goods went between the EC and Japan: US$64
billion between Japan and the U.S.; and US$95
billion between the U.S. and the Community. A
growing proportion of Japan's exports go to the
Community (12 percent plus) and to the U.S. (25
percent and more).
Figures like these illustrate clearly why Europe,
the U.S. and Japan are the three major pillars of the
free world trading system, buttresses of the GATT
and dominant partners in the OECD. If trade rela-
tions between America and Japan deteriorated
seriously, we would feel the shock in Europe and the
international system would shudder. If Europe and
Japan were to quarrel, it would have the same effect.
When Japan's huge trade surplus with the U.S.
provokes legislators to table "reciprocity" bills in
the U.S. Congress, this brings one degree closer the
prospect of restrictive moves in Europe, whose deficit
with Japan is of comparable magnitude. Protectionist
forces on both sides of the Atlantic tend to feed upon
each other-and incidentally in the process render
trans-Atlantic trade relations more difficult. In
international trade, as John Donne said, no man is an
island. We iive in an interdependent world.
Which brings me to the Community and Japan.
Vice President Haferkamp of the EC Commission
in Brussels put it this way recently to some senior
visiting Japanese politicians.
"The regrettable fact is that the EC now has trade
problems with Japan of sufficient seriousness to
compromise the overall economic and perhaps poli-
tical relationship between us. If we cannot solve our
trade problems, or at any rate render them less acute,
then our efforts to restore prosperity and growth to
our domestic economies, and to the free world as a
whole, will be substantially set back. More than this,
the tensions now prevailing in relations with Japan.
not only in Europe, but also in the U.S., risk precipi-
tating the end of the free-world trading system as
we have known it in the post-war years."
There is in fact now a historically well-established
structural trade imbalance between Japan and the
Community which gave Europe a trade deficit with
Japan of US$12.2 billion in 1980, and higher still in
I 98 1. Around 80 percent ofour exports to Japan are
manufactured products. Last year, in real terms,
such exports to Japan actually declined. We in
fl
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Europe continue. moreover, to be haunted by theprospect of a renewed Japanese export drive io the
Community later this yeai, fueled by as yet sluggish
Japanese domestic demand and by it. .rii.nt
absurdly low international parity of tle yen.
There are three things to remember about all this:
the historical background, the wider context. and the
current domestic economic situation in Europe.
"...the pressures within the Community are
now considerable for a change in the system,
notably in regard to Japan."
First. the historical background as far as Europe
and Japan are concerned.
This structural imbalance did not emerge yester_
day from nowhere and will not disappear inlo a btact
hole tomorrow. In 1963, the ten present members
of the European Community had a trivial US$g
million deficit with Japan, and an export/import
coverage ratio with Japan of over 9g percent. fhis
ratio fell steadily, to 72 percent in I 970, to 44 percent
n il1975 and to 34 percent in 19g0. Europ.i. t.ud.ll deficit rocketed from US$8 million in 1963 to
n US$500_ir1lli9n in 1970, to US$3.4 billion in 1975,I lo over US$-12 billion in 1980. Japan,s exporrs toEurope rose from US$0.5 billion in I963 to US$ l g.5billion in 1980. The imbalance has continued to
increase and the Community,s cover ratio has
continued to fall in l9gl.
Second, in the wider context, Europe,s experience
is not unique. It is not due to a strange entreprineurial
decline, or some mysterious collapse of moral fibre
peculiar to the EC. Our experience has been shared
by most of Japan's trading partners. other than those
which supply her almost exclusively with energy and
raw materials.
The U. S. deficit has grown in a fashion comparable
to our own, although admittedly on double the two_
way volume of trade which we enjoy with Japan.
Sometimes Europe, sometimes the U.S., has had the
higher nominal bilateral deficit with Japan.
. 
The newly industrialised countrieJ (NICs) of
Asia have found it as difiicult to conduct balanced
two-way trade with Japan as the rest of us, to the
point that Taiwan now seems to have thrown in the
sponge by resorting to comprehensive import restric_
tions against Japan.
Taking all developing countries together in 19g0,
the Community imported four timeJ as much from
thgm as Japan did (US$69 billion against US$l6
billion). Broken down by category, *" gure a market
to the less developed countries three times as large
for raw materials and food, but six times as large f6r
manufactured products.
The wider trade picture therefore looks to me like
9,J {upll has exported manufactured goods to theEC, the U.S. and elsewhere on a large ind growing
scale for the past 15 years. But Japin,s imports oT
manufactured products from all its partners liave, by
contrast, remained relatively low. This applies to
the EC, the U.S., the NICs and the Third^ World
as a whole. Among the OECD countries, only one
country imports less manufactured goods per iapita
than does Japan. The absolute vilue oi Japar,s
manufactured imports is the same as that of a imall
advanced country like Switzerland. In 1960, Japa_
nese imports of manufactures were worth 2.4 percent
of GNP. In 1980, despite a phenomenal expansion
of world trade as the result of successive GATT
negotiations, this figure was approximately the same.
Over the same period, the EC and the U.S. had
doubled this percentage. Thus, the signihcantly
increased penetration of the U.S. and Ee marketi
that accompanied the liberalization of trade as a
result of the Dillon, Kennedy and Nixon Rounds
of GATT negotiations has not so far been emulatedby Japan on a comparable scale. you and we
opened our markets, to a degree which Japan has
yet to do.
l7
Speakrir-q of-/z,or,rr
Third, the domestic economic background in the
Community. Unemployment has now reached the
I I million mark. Economic growth in the Community
was negative last year and is not likely to be much
more than 1 percent in 1982. The Community was
last year, and is likely to remain this year. substan-
tially in the red, both as to its current account, and
as to the visible trade balance with the rest of the
world. In many critical sectors of our industry ex-
tensive restructuring is required, and is in fact now
beginning to take place. But this process is to
some degree wlnerable to adverse international
economic developments.
Against this background, the pressures within
the Community are now considerable for a change
in the system, notably in regard to Japan. In a
multilateral world, bilateral ups and downs are only
to be expected. Swings and roundabouts are inevitably
the order of the day. It would be would wrong to
expect to balance our books neatly with all our
partners. But the free trade system can only survive
if there is a substantial exchange of goods between
the world's major trading partners.
In fact, the conviction within the European
Community is growing that Japan, with its relatively
prosperous economy and its domestic market of 120
million consumers, makes an inadequate contribu-
tion, in terms of imports from other developed and
developing countries, to the expansion of world trade.
More than this, Japan is perceived as requiring her
partners to shoulder a heavier share of the burden
of sustaining the international trading system than
Japan herself is ready to assume. The impression
even exists in some quarters in Europe that Japan
still prefers to try to"wait it out"-to take only the
minimum absolutely necessary remedial action. at
the last moment, to avoid a major showdown.
However that may be, much more widespread is an
EC perception that Japan is not yet sufficiently
international in its approach to world eco-
nomic problems.
But this does not mean that the arthorities in this
country are dragging their feet. We Europeans are
grateful for the efforts which the government has
so far made, particularly in the nontariffarea, to bring
Japanese practice more into line with generally
accepted international practice. The recently decided
accelerated MTN tariffcuts, while of only negligible
trade impact for us, were at least a symbol of a new
and welcome political approach. The EC would like
to encourage the Japanese authorities to continue
in the same direction. It is surely undesirable that
"trade frictions" should constantly dominate the
headlines and that our economic relations generally
should be in such a continually uncertain and
troubled state. I welcome, therefore, the willingness
of the Cabinet and of the LDP leadership to take the
trade problems of the EC and the U.S. as seriously
as they deserve. In this respect, there has been a
qualitative change for the better. I hope that not
only industrial and business circles, but also the
ranks of the bureaucracy, will now follorv the new
political lead.
"...the conviction within the European
Community is growing that Japan...makes
an inadequate contribution...to the expansion
of world trade."
This said, while Japan has taken steps in the right
direction, there is still a very long way to go. What
is required is to create the social. economic and
commercial conditions in Japan which will enable
the cause as well as the symptoms of the current trade
problem to be dealt with. Only this will offer a reai
prospect of a more balanced Japanese trade relation-
ship with the Community and the U.S. Meanwhile,
an undeniable gap remains between what it has
been possible for the Japanese government to do
up to now, and the expectations of the European
l
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Community for an early and substantial improve_
ment in European exports to Japan.
It is not for the Community_or for the U.S., forthat matter-to seek to diciate to a friendly and
sovereign partner precisely what the latter should
or should not do. My Japanese interlocutors fre_quently invite me to state what Europe,s specific
requirements are. Japanese attention io deiail is,
of course. well known. And no doubt both we and you
have induced them. through our repeateO nitty_gritit
complaints. to think in terms of sectors, barrilri anithe micro-economic dimension.
- 
'Jh. impression even exists in some quartersin Europe that Japan still prefers to...take only
the minimum...remedial action."
Those of us fortunate enough to live here are weliplaced to appreciate the historical and culturalbackground of modern Japan, as well as the many
admirable. even enviable, features of Japanese lifl
and work. Myself a diplomat and profeisional ob_
server of mankind for more than a quarter century,
and also a friend of Japan, I like to think that I do
understand some of the domestic political constraintsin Japan. Like Germany and Ifaly, she is heavily
dependent on costly imported .n..gy. Jupan is distant
from most other developed countrils. The Japanesepeople have remained more homogeneous than
most others and it is less than 130 yeais ago that theperiod of national seclusion whic-h Iasted for over
two centuries came to an end. We should not expectthat Japan will become more internationally inte_grated overnight. As I frequently explain io my
authorities, there are reasons why things 
"." 
u,
they are.
But what is sauce for the goose is naturallv also
sa_uce for the gander. Mutatis mutandis, we in EuropeIabor under historical constraints and social and
economic difficulties. We have our own farmers,
workers, business people, our own unemployed
masses, our own electorates to consider. We too need
to be understood. The economic pressures on us, and
on the international trade system, are great. Govem_
ments in Europe can and do fall on issues such
as these.
The question therefore is, can the growing tradegap between the EC and Japan be firsiarrested, and
then narrowed? If so, in what manner, and above
all, how soon? If not, what policy, how best to manage
our mutual relationship in the present difficult
circumstances?
The following is what I myself would like to see:
_ 
(a) The further opening up of the Japanese market.I would welcome a significant increase in the level
of Japan's imports of manufactured and processed
good_s (currentlyjust under 22 percent of totai imports),
so that this level more closely approachei that
September 1982
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By, it is today unfortunately no longer a solutionfor the EC side to continue conscienti6usly to draw
up long lists of requests, and for Japanesjoffrcials,
as in the past, to go through them laboriously poini
by point, indicating those lew items on which iomeprogress can be achieved and explaining why noprogress will be possible on the many remairiing itlms.
Rather, as we see it, it is for theiapanese govern_
ment itself to demonstrate, in a 
-arne. to be iutono_
mously determined, that Japan intends to reciprocate
t9 th9 Community the trading opportunities whichft... 9o*Tunity has already 
-given to Japan, and
which, as the trade figures_indicale, Japan fra, atieaJf
substantia_lly exploited. We are not utopian inno_
cents or idle dreamers. We neither expect nor desire
revolutionary action instantly to change the whole
economic and social structure of Japanl Although it
would relieve us, we do not insist on a quantum leapforward by Japan. But we do want an Lvolutionary
approach, with speedy and worthwhile initial results
and a clear political commitment to substantive
change in the longer term.
19
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prevailing in our own economy (44 percent). The
questions here are: Can the Japanese government
take positive action to achieve this objective-for
example, by setting 30 percent as its immediate aim,
as the Federal German Minister of Economics,
Count Otto von Lambsdorff, suggested in Tokyo
two weeks ago? Can the authorities give systematic
guidance to the manufacturing industry, public
corporations, business associations and so forth, to
this effect? Will it be possible for the Japanese
government to adopt early and extensive further
trade measures, whether as regards tariffs, non-tariff
barriers, or other economic and commercial impedi-
ments to a more balanced external trade relationship?
The social and economic structure in Japan tends to
be import-impervious and marked by a "self-suffi-
ciency syndrome". Can this be progressively
modified so as to achieve greater integration and
division of labor between this country and her
GATT and OECD partners?
(b) Japanese export restraint. Export-led growth
by Japan is bound to arouse external resentment at
a time when her partners are in economic recession
and are in the process of restructuring their industries.
For the past two calendar years-at the height of an
international recession greater than any the world
has known since the Second World War-nearly
three-quarters of Japan's relatively high economic
growth has been export-induced. I admit that, as far
as the EC is concerned, over the past 12 months
Japanese exporters to Europe have on the whole
been prudent in sectors of particular sensitivity for
us, and I appreciate this. But we need to know-as
the U.S. needs to know-whether we can expect
continued and effective moderation of Japanese
exports to the Community as a whole in certain key
sectors, this year and next.(c) Financial and monetary matters and invest-
ment. I will not go into this now, as I want to con-
centrate on trade. But the trade implications are clear.
Can Japan not only reciprocate the flrnancial access
already granted to her in Europe, but also compen-
sate to some degree for her enorrnous visible trade
surplus, by permitting greater European participation
in the Japanese capital market and improved access
to Japan for our highly competitive financial services?
The free trade system cannot work effectively if
exchange rates fluctuate wildly. What can the
authorities in Japan do, beyond pointing to high
U.S. interest rates as the sole source of all evil, to
encourage a more realistic exchange rate for the
yen? There is also the important related question
of investment. Can a climate for foreign investment
be created in Japan comparable to that in America
and Europe? Will Japan itself make more value-
adding, technologically innovative, manufacturing
investment of the right kind in the right places
in the EC?
"I am confident that Japan is ready to exert
her economic strength in the form of more
positive international leadership."
(d) A broader economic relationship. Mr. Edward
Heath, the former British Prime Minister, appealed
in Tokyo this month for the relationship between
Europe and Japan to be broadened beyond the issues
of bilateral trade. Among the areas he pointed out
were monetary cooperation. energy, technology and
investment. The Community has in fact made a start
in this direction and a clearer Japanese response is
now looked for. Can industrial cooperation be
developed? Also cooperation in the field of Northi
South relations and aid to development, and in regard
to long-term, government-sponsored scientific re-
search and development? The agreement of principle
reached between M. Jean-Pierre Chevenement, the
French Minister for Research and Technology. and
his Japanese counterparts last week illustrates the
way forward.
20
t(e) Japanese leadership. The president of the
French Republic, at his press conference last Friday,
suggested that Japan should be prepared to make
some sacrifices, so as to assume a share of interna-
tional responsibilities more commensurate with this
country's economic might. The U.S. view has also
been that the time has come for Japan to assume
more fully than hitherto the responsibilities of a world
leader. U.S. negotiators have pointed out in recent
months that Japan is, economically speaking, no
longer an adolescent. It has caught up with, and in
some respects surpassed, its Western partners. A
former U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Peter Peterson,
said in Tokyo last month that "Japan now has the
power, and thus the inescapable duty, to help shape
and execute tomorrow's agenda for the world
economy." Happily, government statements in Japan
have echoed this sentiment. At the Western Eco-
nomic Summit atVersailles this June, and in the years
to come, both Europe and America are therefore
counting on the imagination and statesmanship that
Japan will show.(f) Warmer hearts and cooler heads. These days,
Japan suffers from a "bad press" in Europe and
America, and this is regrettable. Emotional thinking
is sometimes too much in evidence. Unfortunately,
however, Japan too is not immune. There is emotion
of the wrong kind in some of the fringe reactions in
this country to external trade frictions. Foreigners
are not being unfriendly, nor are they seeking to make
Japan a scapegoat, when they ask for assistance and
redress. Everybody welcomes the fact that Japan is
a democratic, stable and prosperous member of the
Western comity of nations. No one belittles the
efficiency of the more dynamic sections of the
Japanese economy, sections which offer interna-
tional consumers a reliable and innovative product,
and help to advance the frontiers of applied tech-
nology to the ultimate benefit of all mankind. Japan
is not a culprit in these respects. But problems are
problems and facts are facts and they have to be
September 1982
squarely faced between friends and partners. The
statistics show that the Europeans in practice hold
open their markets more widely to all comers than do
the Japanese. Europe devotes more of its GNP than
Japan to defence and to overseas aid. Beneficial
European industrial investment is largely kept at
home. Europe, more than Japan, is bearing the cost
of international economic adjustment in terms of
dangerously high unemployment. The shoe is on
the other foot-or perhaps I should say the scapegoat
is on the European side of the fence.
Meanwhile, we in Europe and America need to
match our responses to what is done in Japan. A
defensive or defeatist approach will not do. Protec-
tionism must be kept in check. It does not solve the
problem; it destroys the welfare it is supposed to
safeguard; it enfeebles the very international system
that is the only alternative to economic nationalism
and to the negative consequences of possible trade war.
This applies as much to the U.S. as to the EC.
With your automobile limitation agreement, for
example, you are no holier than we. Much more
important, the reciprocity legislation favored in
some quarters in the U.S. Congress is, like all two-
edged swords, a dangerous weapon. It can cut down
agreed international rules and bleed the GATT to
death. Reciprocity in a narrow, bilateral or secroral
sense, as former Trade Representative Bob Strauss
was arguing here a week or two back, has no place in
any enlightened trade policy. Only reciprocity in its
broadest sense-i.e., equality of competitive oppor-
tunities across the board between Japan, the EC and
the U.S.-is consistent with a liberal trade policy.
I am glad that government officials in Washington
also hold firmly to this view.
This leads to an important policy decision recently
taken in Brussels, one which carries implications for
the U.S. The European Community has discussed
trade issues with Japan patiently and persistently
in Tokyo and Brussels for at least ten years, and with
mounting anxiety and discomfort for the past livc.
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In cooperation with Japan, we will continue this
dialogue, patiently and persistently, in the future.
But insofar as the EC/Japan trade gap has continued
to widen, and the low percentage of manufactures in
Japan's imports has remained unchanged, we have
so far obtained no satisfactory result. We have
therefore opted to have recourse to Article XXIII of
the GATT. This Article provides for consultations,
initially on a bilateral basis, but, failing a settlement,
in a multilateral panel and ultimately, should this
be necessary, before all the GATT contracting
parties. where it can be shown that benefits which
ought to have accrued to one contracting party have
been nullified or impaired by another contracting
party-in this case Japan.
To quote the text of the EC's written representa-
tions in Geneva of April 7, we are indeed now of the
view that "the benefits of successive GATT negotia-
tions with Japan have not been realised, owing to a
series of factors particular to the Japanese economy
which have discouraged imports of products other
than raw materials. As a result of this situation,
combined with the pattern of growth of Japanese
exports to the European Community, the GATT
objective of 'reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements' has not been adequately achieved
between the European Community and Japan."
To spell this out further, the EC view is simply this.
Japan is now the most powerful single industrialised
country after the U.S., accounting for 10 percent
of world GNP. A greater effort is consequently re-
quired from Japan in the 1980s than was expecteC
in the 1960s to sustain two-way trade and to move
away progressively from the autarkic and self-
sufficient economic structure that has character-
ised the post-war years in this country. The expec-
tions that Japan's partners place upon her in this
respect are going to continue to grow as long as the
global system holds together and Japan's place in that
system remains as important as it now is. It will be
increasingly a source of intemational strain forJapan
to remain an importer chiefly of raw materials, energy
resources and certain foodstuffs, self-sufficient in
most other respects, yet an exporter of finished goods
to her GATT partners along a broad, largely unim-
peded one-way street. Sooner rather than later, there
has to be more give and take. There has to be what
GATT calls "mutually advantageous arrangements."
To conclude, I return to the metaphysical poets
and John Donne's view that no man-or for that
matter no nation-is an island. Japan and the
Community, and Japan and the U.S., cannot choose
the path of trade isolation. We have each been there
before-in the 1930s-and paid a bitter price for it.
Those were the days. remember. of "Buddy, can you
spare a dime?" The only acceptable way forward
today is multilateral, cooperative and imaginative.
We need cooler heads-and, insofar as these can
exist in international affairs and matters of state,
warmer hearts-in Japan. in the States and in Europe.
I believe that the Japanese leadership has alreadl-
taken this view for sometime. I am confident that
Japan is ready to exert her economic strength in the
form of more positive international leadership.
This being so, our mutual problems-which are
not shadows but are real-become problems not
only of substance, but also of timing. The question is
no longer if, or how, Japan can respond to the chal-
lenge; it is when? Unfortunately, time is a commoditl'
in short supply. By I 990. other things being equal and
barring accidents, a fairer balance will certainly have
been struck, a greater degree of interdependence
achieved, in the JapanlEClU.S. trade triangle. Bu:
can we get from 1982 to 1990 without an accidentl
I think, myself. that the situation is still in hanci.
If there were such an accident. Japan wouldnotbe the
only victim. We would all lose something. As John
Donne wrote, if the bell tolls. it will toll also for you
and for me. tr(This speech was originallv titled "The Europeart
Community's Trade Relations with Japan-and their
Implications for the U.5.")
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